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Abstract 
This paper studies the impact of taxation on economic growth of the eight WAEMU countries. Among the 
critiques addressed to the public sector, numerous are those that refer principally to the negative effects which entail 
high weight and increasing of taxation. The growth rate can be influenced by economic policy choice relative to 
taxation which has an effect on the decisions of economic agents and is due to the productive public expenditures. 
The reason is that high level of taxation can be distortionary and like this negatively influences economic growth 
while law weight of taxation can generate some returns which will be enclosed in production. In order to catch this 
phenomenon in the WAEMU countries, we have contrary to the more previous studies accounted a non-linear 
effect of taxation on economic growth. Mobilizing a dynamic panel data specification over the period 1989–2012, 
the econometric results suggest the absence of a non-linear relationship between taxation and economic growth of 
WAEMU. Specifically, weak and high rates respectively at short run and long run do not create distortions and 
hence affect positively economic growth of WAEMU and generate income. This effect on economic growth then 
increase over time as the fiscal revenue increase. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent studies (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993 ; Nelson and Singh, 1994; Devarajan, Swaroop and 
Zou, 1996 ; Barro, 1997 ; Tanzi and Zee, 1997 ; Nubukpo, 2007) analyze the impact of public 
expenditures on economic growth and arrive at the contradictory results which show the 
difficulty to establish with certainty the sense, the nature and the significance of the impact of 
public expenditures on economic growth. The absence of empirical evidence robustness relative 
to the relationship between public expenditures and economic growth can be partly due to the 
non linear relationship between these variables. In other terms, negative relationship between 
public expenditures and economic growth is due to the distortionary effect that high income 
taxes use on economic growth. Indeed, one of the fundamental questions in macroeconomics 
and public finances is how changes in fiscal policy affect economic activity and social welfare. 
Then, is there a clear relationship between the taxes collected by a country and his economic 
performances ?  
Indeed, growth rate can be influenced by economic policy choices relative to taxation which has 
an effect on economic agent decisions and is due to the public expenditures productive. Taxation 
can have both a negative and positive effect on economic growth. The negative effect is due to 
the distortions in choices and effects of discouragement factors. The positive effect is due 
indirectly to the expenditures financed by the taxation. The endogenous growth model with a 
public good as input provides a positive channel through which taxation can increase economic 
growth. The relationship is not monotonous because an increase of tax rate over the optimum 
reduces the growth rate. In practice, the economies can be situated on both sides of the 
optimum. Similarly, an evidence of simulations provides a vast range of estimation with law 
significant of taxation effect on growth. Thus, since the theory is not conclusive about the 
taxation effect on growth, it is therefore natural to turn to the empirical evidence (Myles, 2009). 
One of the macroeconomic convergence criteria of West-African Economic and Monetary 
Union (WAEMU)2 aims to reach a minimum fiscal pressure rate of 17% in the different 
economies. However, although taxation differs from one country to another, so much in his 
structure and at the level of the rates used, sometimes with deep disparities, the average rate of 
tax pressure in recent years in these countries is generally lower than those set by the WAEMU.  
In cause, the difficulties encounter by the Governments in enlargement of taxable base especially 
in reason for no taxation of a large part of economy (agriculture for example), of importance and 
                                                           
2 WAEMU regroups eight countries (Benin, Burkina, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo) having 
in common the usage of franc CFA and the Central Bank of West-Africa Countries (BCEAO). 
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rapid development of the informal sector during the last years. Besides, tax evasion and fiscal 
fraud, as fiscal and customs exonerations limit the performances of financial administrations. 
This situation is accentuated by the ineffectiveness of fiscal control due to human resource 
problems in the financial administrations and to the unsuitability of encouragement measures 
compared with sought-after aims. At this rhythm, the governments of the Union do not arrive to 
bring together in great quantity sufficient returns to cover priority needs when one knows that 
budgetary returns constitutes an essential instrument of the development strategies. 
In the objectives to improve their national fiscal policy and to be registered in the dynamics of 
the convergence criterions realization defined by the WAEMU, the governments are resolutely 
committed in the fiscal reforms. However, do not overlook the negative effects of too heavy 
taxation and fiscal pressure in total phase with economic reality of the sub-region, since 
policymakers and economists warned that excessive taxation is costly for the government in 
terms of economic growth and tax revenues3.  
Indeed, most the WAEMU countries are among the poorest of the world and for some prey to 
socio-policy instability. There is therefore much to do about attracting investors but also to 
recover the taxes paid by enterprises and populations. In such context, does not the WAEMU 
earn to propose some more supple criterions of macroeconomic convergences, particularly those 
relative to taxation? The answer for such question requires a clear knowledge of the relationship 
between taxation and economic growth of WAEMU countries. 
Theoretically, it usually considers that tax have a negative correlation with economic growth. Like 
this, high taxes rates mean law economic growth rates. This is explained by the act that taxation 
introduces distortions in the economy, because they have not a neuter effect on the individual 
behavior. All taxes except fixed tax (only neuter tax, though impossible to determine it in 
practice) introduce distortions in an economic system. The distortionary4 tax changes the system 
of individual stimulation, like this their decisions for example on labor and leisure or saving and 
consummation are different of that they would be in non-tax environment. The distortions that 
                                                           
3 Arthur Laffer was one of the pioneers who illustrate formally the idea of a non linear relationship between tax rate 
and growth. He points out that, for a given economy, there is a fiscal level effort beyond which taxation is 
damageable for economy. 
4 In practice, most of taxes are distortionary in the opposed direction from fixed taxes; ceteris paribus, they have 
therefore tendency to deform resource allocation through their impact on saving and investment. However, the act 
that they have or no a perverse effect on growth in the net terms depends on profits in terms of the expenditures 
growth that they serve to finance. More generally, there is not all the distortionary taxes that have some adverse 
effects on economic growth at long-term; the net effect depends on the fact that the considered tax is or no used as 
an instrument to correct negative externalities or other distortions. The impact of taxation on the level of investment 
operates through the capital cost. The evidence of this effect is limited for developing countries. The taxation can 
nevertheless affect investment through a differentiated structure of the profits taxation rate (See Agénor, 2005). 
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taxes introduce in the economy result from the reduction of efficacy. Therefore, high taxes rates 
mean high distortionary rates.  
Though, the theory underlines especially a negative relationship between taxation and economic 
growth, the empirical research provide non ambiguous results. Indeed, recent studies analyzed 
the empirical impact of taxation on economic growth (Myles, 2009; Harberger, 1964, Mendoza et 
al., 1995; Engen and Skinner, 1992 and 1996; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993 ; McDermott and 
Wescott, 1996 ; Alesina and Perotti, 1996 ; Xu, 1994 ; Milesi-Ferretti and Roubini, 1995 ; Cashin, 
1994 ; Tanzi and Schuknecht, 1995 ; Leibfritz and al., 1997; Skreb, 1999 ; Dackehag and 
Hansson, 2012 ; Arnold and all., 2011; Lee and Gordon, 2004; Arseneau and al., 2011; Ebrahimi 
and Vaillancourt, 2012; Padovano and Galli, 2001; Widmalm, 2001; Mutascu and Danuletiu, 
2011; etc.) and are obtain non consensual clear results as the theory suggests. The different results 
obtained by these studies do not permit to draw univocal conclusion about the negative impact 
of taxation on growth. Some things are in cause namely: (i) different definitions of state in 
different countries and periods (whether it is a central government or general government with 
extra-budgetary funds and local governments), which means different levels of taxation; (ii) 
problems of measuring of individual tax variables, such as marginal tax rates (Easterly and 
Rebelo, 1993; Engen and Skinner, 1996); (iii) difficulties in sorting out the impact of individual 
tax variables on growth, because of complex interactions of fiscal variables (tax increase does not 
have to reduce growth if such increased taxes are used for financing those forms of public 
investments that will increase productivity of private investments, thus stimulating growth); (iv) 
difficulties in separating the impact on growth of other economic variables from the impact of 
fiscal variables only; (v) it has turned out that quantitative results are very sensitive to the 
parameters the values of which have still not been estimated reliably (e.g. elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution, labor supply elasticity, depreciation rate of human capital etc) (Xu, 
1994); (vi) lack of empirical data enabling unambiguous acceptance or rejection of a conclusion of 
some theoretical model. 
Indeed, using the personal income tax on corporate income, land tax and consummation tax in a 
panel for 21 OECD countries from 1971 to 2004, Arnold et al. (2011) found that 1% increase of 
consummation returns taxes compared with income tax increases GDP per capita for 0.74% at 
long-term. Using also a panel for 70 countries through the world from 1970 to 1997, Lee and 
Gordon (2004) found that a decrease with 10% for the corporate tax result in an increase with 
1% to 2% for the annual growth rate. They found a positive correlation between returns of 
personal taxes and taxation rate of the corporate income. Arseneau et al. (2011) use a panel for 19 
OECD countries from 1972 to 2007 (5-year averages) and found that an increase for 0.1 point of 
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the consummation tax ratio on the personal income tax results in an increase of GDP per capita 
for 0.12%. These effects are non significant for the other types of taxes.  
Controlling the level of GDP in the beginning of each period, physical capital, human capital, 
trade openness and fiscal returns, Ebrahimi and Vaillancourt (2012) obtain a negative impact of 
taxation on GDP per capita growth rate for the Canadian provinces. This impact changes from 
one tax to another: Consummation tax and corporate income tax have more high negative effect 
on growth rate compared with personal income tax. They found that the significance level of the 
annual panel data variables is higher than the one of panel data variables with 5-year averages.  
In the same way, considering a panel of 25 rich OECD countries for the period 1975-2010, 
Dackehag and Hansson (2012) find negative relationship between income tax (corporate income 
tax and personal income tax) and economic growth. They have also tested and obtained an 
empirical non-linear relationship between corporate income tax, personal income tax and 
economic growth. Thus, law levels of income tax influence positively economic growth when 
high levels of this tax decelerate it. 
Padovano and Galli (2001) use a panel of 23 OECD countries for the period 1961-1990 (10-year 
average) and found that one unit increase of the marginal tax rate results in 0.011 unit increase of 
GDP growth rate in average.  
Using a panel of 23 industrialized OECD countries between 1965 and 1990, Widmalm (2001) 
found that 1% increase of the returns tax coming from personal income tax results in about 2% 
increase of the average GDP growth rate.  
Ogbonna and Ebimobowei (2012) worked with Nigeria data on the period 1994-2009 and found 
that fiscal reforms are significantly and positively correlated with economic growth and that these 
fiscal reforms cause economic growth à la Granger.  
In short, there is an absence of consensus on the size and the sense of the relationship between 
taxation and economic growth because of the ambiguity of the relationship between the two 
variables due fundamentally to distortionary effects of taxation on economic growth. When we 
analyze the stylized acts of the WAEMU countries (See figures 2-9 of appendix C), it appear that 
the evolutions of tendencies for fiscal returns ratio and economic growth rate per capita of the 
WAEMU economies are always in phase. The tendencies slopes of the fiscal returns ratio are 
relatively very steep compared with those of growth rate per capita relatively weak. Thus, in a 
context of harmonization of national fiscal policies within the WAEMU in accordance with the 
convergence criterions defined by the Union and especially in the prolongation of the reflections 
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relative to the factors growth within developing countries of post-structural adjustment, it is 
important to evaluate the impact of taxation on growth for the WAEMU countries.  
The following of this paper is organize as this: in section 2, the model of regression is presented, 
section (3) presents the source of data, the model estimations are presented in section (4), section 
(5) presents results and interpretations, and finally, section (6) concludes.  
2. Model 
We use a model of panel data which has for objective to quantify the behaviors concerning 
economic growth of WAEMU countries moreover in their individual differences than in their 
dynamic properties. We draw up with that in mind, an econometrical model in which the 
characteristics of each country are taking into account as specific effects which are variables 
observed, constant in time period and supposed to influence their behaviors. Accounting the 
sources of unobservable heterogeneity allow to complete the heterogeneity of the observables 
variables introduced in the model. The model of regression that we estimate must be writing as 
follows:  
                             ( )it it it it it i t ity y y x z− −− = − + + + + +α β γ µ δ ε1 11                                     (1) 
where 
ity  
represents the dependent variable, the GDP growth rate per capita of country i at the 
date t, 
itx  
is the variable of taxation (fiscal returns ratio) of the country i at time periode t and 
represents the important variable of our study, 
itz  
is the explanatory variables vector (income, 
private investment, trade openness, population dependence ratio, labor force growth rate, public 
expenditures ratio, saving as share of GDP ratio, the logarithm of the initial income per capita is 
measures by the logarithm of initial GDP per capita of every under period). The term
iµ  
represents countries fixed effect (non measurable shocks). The terms 
tδ  
represent the sample 
effect in time period (temporal specific effect). This term represents the trend which affects 
economic growth of each country as businesses cycle. The fiscal returns are probably affected by 
this event. The error terms 
itε  represent the idiosyncratic distributions which change by country 
and in time and are supposed to be iid (independently and identically distributed) with zero 
average and 2
εσ  
as variance. As we have already underlined it; i and t represent respectively 
country and temporal index. α , β  and γ  are the parameters to be estimated.  
The study about the relationship between taxation and economic growth can be faced some 
statistical problems. One of them is endogeneity problem. The fiscal policy can at a time period  
influence economic growth and must be influenced by economic growth. High tax rates can 
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result in weak economic growth rate, on the other hand, periods of weak economic growth can 
require high tax rates in the objective to finance the expenditures increase due for example to the 
unemployment rate increasing. To solve this problem, we used 4-year averages of the GDP per 
capita growth rate and other explanatory variables. Besides, we use GMM in dynamic panel of 
Arellano and Bond (1991) which provides solutions to the multiple problems of simultaneous 
bias, inverse causality and omitted variables. 
We can rewrite equation (1) as follows:  
                                          it it it it i t it
y y x z
−
= + + + + +α β γ µ δ ε1                                            (2) 
Where 
ity = ittxcroispibpt , 
′  itx = it itrevtax revtax
2 , 
[ ]′itz = it it it it it it it itinvpri ouvcom depop txcroisft dpgov epnat infl lrevintp  
[ ]1 2=β β β  and [ ]1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8=γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ . 
txcroispibpt : is GDP per capita growth rate allowing to measure the inhabitants prosperity.  
revtax : is the fiscal returns ratio measured by the fiscal returns as a share of GDP (in %). The 
fiscal returns are equal to the sum of fiscal returns from all forms of taxation imposed by the 
WAEMU countries governments. We make out two types of fiscal returns: direct taxes are those 
which are supported directly by the people who are subject to the tax. They are recovered with a 
roll, that is-to-say a nominative list of the taxpayers. These latter cannot carry over the tax costs 
on other economic agents, at the difference of indirect taxes which are the taxes on expenditures 
that are incorporated in goods prices and consummate services. It exists two categories: the 
Value-Added Tax (VAT), base on consummation, and the indirect taxes, specific taxes relative to 
some products or determined activities. In practice, most regulate taxes are distortionary opposed 
to the fixed taxes; ceteris paribus, they have therefore tendency to deform allocation resource 
through their impact on saving and investment. However, the act that they have or not a perverse 
effect on economic growth in net terms depends on the profits in terms of the expenditures 
growth which they serve to finance. More generally, that is not all the distortionary taxes which 
have some adverse effects on economic growth at long-term; the net effect depends because of 
the considered tax is or not used as an instrument to corrects the negative externality or other 
associated distortions. The impact of taxation on the level of investment operates through the 
capital cost. The evidence of this effect is limited for the developing countries. The taxation can 
nevertheless affects the investment composing through a differentiated structure of the profits 
taxes rate (Agénor, 2000). This one considers that in the total of fiscal returns, relative shares of 
direct taxes, taxes on goods and services, and taxes on exterior trade change considerably 
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between developing countries and in time. Besides, concerning the direct taxes, the share of fiscal 
returns draw from physical person income taxes in developing countries is higher than those one 
due by enterprises. The fiscal returns of WAEMU countries represent more than 127 % of his 
returns in 2012 (See figure 1 of appendix C) showing that the essential public returns of the 
WAEMU countries come from fiscal returns. They permit to the governments of Union to lead 
their different public policies. Finally, because of the distortionary effects that increase income 
taxes can exercise on economic growth, it appears difficult to express an opinion a priori on the 
expected sign of such relationship in the framework of WAEMU.  
invpri : is the private investment. It is a factor of economic growth moreover for the neoclassic 
school than the Keynesian theory. It is measured by the ratio of private gross fixed capital 
formation as a share of GDP (in %). In practice, most of taxes have tendency to deform 
allocation resource through their impact on investment and also on saving. Private investment is 
susceptible to cause externalities effects in accordance with the recent results of endogenous 
growth models (Guellec and Ralle, 1997). Indeed, an enterprise investment allows to this one to 
increases not only his production, but also the one of other enterprises, because of the 
technological externality which it causes. Thus, some empirical studies on African economies 
(Ojo and Oshikoya, 1995; Ghura and Hadjimichael, 1996) have highlighted the presence of a 
positive relationship between investment and GDP growth per capita. 
ouvcom : is the openness trade calculate by the sum of export and import of the WAEMU as a 
share of GDP (in %). It needs to underline that there is all a discussion on the calculation of the 
openness trade indicator (See Siroën, 2000). The indicators proposed today in the literature are 
multiple. Some among them need to build an important data base and serve as “public goods” 
for more recent studies. That is notably the case of the indications calculated by Leamer (1988), 
Barro and Lee (1994), Sachs and Warner (1995). The quasi-totality of the studies concludes to the 
existence of a positive relationship between development and the openness trade. Besides, it 
needs that the measure of the two indicators does not conduct to the ambiguous results. One will 
find a synthesis of empirical studies notably in Edwards (1993) or Serranito (1999). It is a priori 
difficult to predict the sign of openness trade on economic growth for the WAEMU countries 
seeing that these ones import much more than they do not export and the strong dependence of 
their exports to the raw materials submitted to the foreign terms deterioration and, the weakness 
of the intra zones trade.  
depop : is the population dependence ratio. This ratio takes in account the share of population 
who not work and in charge to the active population. That is the population aged 0-14 and upper 
65 as a share of the total population. This variable is supposed to be correlated negatively with 
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the economic growth rate per capita because of the relative importance of the population aged 0-
14 (around 45% of the total population). 
txcroisft : is the growth rate of labor force (in %). It allows catching the workload make in an 
economy. This workload proportional to the active population is supposed to influence positively 
the production, with a threshold effect, because of the decreasing marginal produces (Nubukpo, 
2007). 
dpgov : is the ratio of the public expenditures measured by the total of public expenditures as a 
share of GDP (in %). It appears difficult being pronounced a priori on the expected sign of the 
relationship between public expenditures and economic growth rate of the WAEMU countries 
because of the wealth and the diversity of empirical results relative to the impact of public 
expenditures on economic growth. Nevertheless, using public consummation ratio as a share of 
GDP (in %) over the period 1971-1995, Tenou (1999) obtains a negative relationship with 
economic growth in the WAEMU countries. In return, the coefficient which is found (-0,158) is 
the same in absolute value that the one obtained for total investment (public and private) rate 
(0,159), that conduct to make undetermined the effective impact of the public expenditures on 
economic growth of WAEMU economy. 
epnat : is the ratio of saving measured by the domestic saving as a share of GDP (in %). In 
practice, most regulate distortionary taxes have tendency to deform resource allocation through 
their impact not only on the saving but also on the investment. We expected a positive sign on 
economic growth of WAEMU countries.  
infl : is the inflation rate (annual in %) in the WAEMU countries. This rate keeps ambivalent 
relationships with economic growth rate (Nubukpo, 2007). The non negligible agricultural 
production share in the composition of global supply offers in the sub-Saharan countries and the 
deflationist impact on the food goods generally due to a good agricultural campaign, justify the 
hypothesis of the existence of an inverse relationship between global supply and inflation. 
However, the increasing of inflation rate can also be indicative of a “demand effect” result within 
the economy. Consequently, a high inflation can be the sign of an economy in growth, following 
to the Keynesian hypothesis, illustrated by the Phillips curve. In all, the expected sign of this 
variable is a priori undetermined, in the sense that the value of his parameter depends on the 
relative evolutions of the supply money, of the demand money and the supply shock.  
lrevintpt : is the initial income per capita measured by the logarithm of the initial GDP per capita 
of every under period. This variable which is appearing only in the second estimation allows 
taking in account conditional convergence (to the starting point). Solow (1956) model predicts 
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that the economies that having an initial income level little high grow more quickly than those in 
which the income level is more important and near their stationary state. Thus, we expected to a 
negative sign of his coefficient for economic growth rhythm of WAEMU countries having a 
higher initial GDP per capita is weaker than the one of WAEMU countries having a weaker 
initial GDP per capita.  
dummies variables : apart from the model variables, six dummies temporal variables (dumpt1, dumpt2, 
dumpt3, dumpt4, dumpt5 and dumpt6) and eight dummies individual variables (dumdev , dumbur91, 
dumcd98, dumcd10, dumma92, dumnig92, dumsen99 and dumtg91) have been introduced in the model. 
The dummies temporal variables are introduced in the model because on the six periods, the first 
is not taken in account in the regressions for the presence of the lagged dependent variable. The 
variables dumtp1, dumtp3 and dumtp6 appear in the first estimation while dumtp2, dumtp3, dumtp4 
and dumtp5 in the second. The reasons of the introduction of the dummies variables in some 
studies on the WAEMU countries are limited. According to Nubukpo (2007), apart from the 
boom beginning of the raw materials (Niger in 1973-1975, Ivory Coast in 1975), the dryness that 
Senegal knew in 1973-1974, the policies crisis (Benin in 1989, Togo in 1993) and the change of 
the franc CFA party in 1994, it is the beginning of the public finance cleansing process with the 
structural adjustment programs adopted by the countries of the Union in the beginning of 1980 
(between 1979 and 1983) which explains the presence of dummies variables in some estimations. 
By another way, the policy unrest in Mali (1991-1992) and in Togo, their consequences on 
Burkina, frontier country, in a context of starting in this country of the structural adjustment 
programs (1991) and the unballastings in Senegal (Nubukpo, 2003). The grave crisis of treasury in 
Niger in 1992 and more recently, the policy unrest in Ivory Coast (2010-2011) are the other 
reasons for the introduction of dummies variables in our model. 
3. Data 
We use a dynamic panel5 of the eight (8) WAEMU countries observed over the period 1989-2012 
to analyze the impact of taxation on economic growth. The data come from the statistics tables 
of the World Bank (World Tables) and the BCEAO statistics (BASTAT).  
The unit root tests on panel data of Im-Pesaran-Shin and Levin-Lin-Chu show that all the 
variables are stationary in level, most of them with trend and constant, except the dependence 
ratio (annual) which is quasi-stationary in level (See table 4 of appendix B)6. 
                                                           
5 Panel data constitute an extremely rich source of information allowing studying the phenomenon in their diversity 
as in their dynamics. 
6 These tests are only possible for a balanced panel. 
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4. Estimations 
The presence of the lagged dependent variable in equation (2) does not permit to use technical 
standards econometrics7. One uses the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in dynamic 
panel which allows controlling the individual and temporal specifics effects, and resolves like this 
the endogeneity bias of the variables, the simultaneous bias, and the inverse causality and omitted 
variables problems. We distingue two types of estimators: the estimator of Arellano and Bond 
(1991) or GMM in difference and the estimator of GMM in system. Note that the using of these 
two estimators presupposes the quasi-stationarity of equation variables in level, and the absence 
of residuals autocorrelations. 
In the estimation of Arellano and Bond (1991), the strategy to answer a possible variable omitted 
bias due to the specific effects is to differentiating equation (2) in level. We obtain the following 
equation: 
     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )′it it it it it it it it t t it ity y y y x x z z− − − − − − −− = − + − + − + − + −α β γ δ δ ε ε1 1 2 1 1 1 1        (3) 
The first difference eliminates the countries specific effect and consequently the bias of the 
omitted variables invariant in the time. By construction, the term ( )it it−−ε ε 1  is correlated with 
the lagged variable in difference ( )it ity y− −−1 2 . The first differences of the explanatory variables 
of the model are instrumented by the lagged values (in level) of those same variables. The 
objective is to reduce the simultaneous bias and the bias due to the presence of lagged dependent 
variable in difference in the left of equation (3).  
Under the hypothesis that the explanatory variables of the model are weakly exogenous (they can 
be influenced by the past values of the growth rate, but still no correlated to the error term future 
realizations) and that the errors terms are not autocorrelated, the following moments conditions 
are apply to the equation in first difference.  
                          ( )⋅ ≥   …it it ity t T− −− = 0    = 3, ,1 for  2; τ ε ε τE                                          (4) 
                          ( )⋅ ≥   …it it itx t T− −− = 0    = 3, ,1 for  2; τ ε ε τE                                          (5) 
                                                           
7 The technical standards econometrics as the OLS do not permit to obtain efficiency estimations of such model 
because of the presence of lagged dependent variable on the right of equation (See Sevestre, 2002) and individual 
heterogeneous of errors terms. 
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                          ( )⋅ ≥   …it it itz t T− −− = 0    = 3, ,1 for  2; τ ε ε τE                                           (6) 
The problem with this estimator is the weakness of instruments that results in considerable bias 
in the finite samples and his precision is asymptotically weak. More precisely, the lagged values of 
the explanatory variables are weak instruments of the equation in first difference. By another way, 
the differentiation of the equation in level eliminates the inter-countries variables and takes in 
account only the intra-countries variations. The GMM estimator in system allows resolving this 
problem (See appendix A). 
5. Results and interpretation 
This subsection presents estimations results of equation (3). These results are obtained from two 
specifications of our model. The first estimates the model on panel data where dependent 
variable, GDP per capita growth rate and independent variables except the dummies variables 
corresponding simultaneously with individual i (country) and time period t (year). The second 
estimates the model always on panel data where the dependent variable, the GDP per capita 
growth rate and the independent variables except the dummies variables and initial income per 
capita corresponding simultaneously with individual i (country) and time period t which is now 4-
year averages annual data. Concretely, the data are 4-year averages over the period 1989-2012 (6 
under periods of 4-year). This procedure allows attenuating the effect of shocks associated to the 
economic cycles on economic growth. In this perspective, the fiscal returns ratio average is the 
one of the four previous years to allow an impact on price adjustment and economy resources 
allocation.  
Table 1 (See appendix B) presents the estimation results for the impact of taxation on economic 
growth rate per capita of WAEMU countries. In this table, estimations (1)-(4) are in the first 
category of specification and estimations (5)-(8) are in the second.  
The coefficient of fiscal returns ratio on GDP is significant in the estimations (1), (2), (5) and (6) 
and positive that is 0.531, 0.858, 0.568 and 1.153 respectively. This coefficient has the same 
positive sign in the other estimations where it is not significant. This suggests that for a given 
level of fiscal returns and other explanatory variables, there is a positive relationship between 
fiscal returns ratio and GDP per capita growth rate. Contrary to the most previous studies, we 
consider a non-linear effect of taxation on economic growth. The reason is that high levels of 
taxation can be distortionary and thus affecting negatively economic growth while weak taxation 
rate can generate incomes which are invested in the production. We found in discordance with 
Arthur Laffer curve that there is not a non-linear relationship between taxation and economic 
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growth of WAEMU. The coefficient of fiscal returns ratio on GDP squared is not significant in 
all estimations but has a negative sign except in estimation (2) where this coefficient is significant 
and also negative (-0.010). This only exception in estimation (2) on the eight estimations (1, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 8) is not sufficient to consider that there is a non-linear relationship between taxation and 
economic growth of WAEMU. Thus, the absence of a non-linear relationship suggests that high 
and weak levels of fiscal returns ratio are favorable for economic growth per capita. 
The coefficient of private investment is significant and negative in estimations (5) and (6). We 
expected a coefficient with a positive sign. Does this mean that in 4-year averages, the private 
investment dynamics is unfavorable to the economic growth per capita? Nevertheless, this 
coefficient is positive in estimations (1), (2) and (3), but is insignificant. 
The coefficient of openness trade is significant and negative in estimations (1), (2), (5), (6) and 
(8). This coefficient is positive in estimations (3) and (4) but is insignificant. The coefficient of 
openness trade can be positive or negative because of the ambiguities underlined previously of 
the relationship between openness trade and economic growth.  
The coefficient of the dependence ratio is significant and negative in estimations (1)-(4) but 
positive and significant in the estimation (5). The increasing of the dependence ratio must have a 
negative effect on the growth rate per capita. 
The coefficient of labor force growth rate is insignificant but with a positive sign.  
The coefficient of government expenditures is positive and significant in estimation (7) and 
suggests that public expenditures dynamics is favorable to GDP per capita growth confirming the 
results of Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996) which found a positive effect. In return, this 
coefficient is negative and insignificant in estimations (3) and (4). It needs to remind that in the 
framework of WAEMU, Nubupko (2007) and Tenou (1999) found a negative relationship using 
annual series. The results apparently contradictory on the annual data and the 4-year averages of 
our estimations confirm the ambivalence of the public expenditures effects on economic growth 
per capita. 
The coefficient of saving is significant and positive in the estimations (3) and (4) in accordance 
with the waits. However, this coefficient is respectively positive and negative in estimations (7) 
and (8) and, insignificant.  
The coefficient of inflation is significant and with a positive sign in the estimation (4). In the 
same way, this coefficient is positive but insignificant in the estimation (8). This suggests that an 
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increase of inflation is favorable to economic growth per capita. Indeed, some empirical studies 
have work on the inflation threshold effect. Thus, Sarel (1996) quoted by Nubukpo (2007) 
showed, with a sample from 87 countries with different levels of development, that inflation 
exert a negative effect on  GDP when it is upper or equalize to 8 %.  
The coefficient of the logarithm of initial income is significant and negative in estimations (5) and 
(6). The negative sign of the coefficient of initial income be indicative of economies conditional 
convergence. One must be expected to the same initial income level in the beginning of each 
period. 
Finally, the coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable is positive in all our estimations. 
However, it is significant only in the estimation (5). This coefficient indeed is the parameter in 
equation (3).  
The estimation of the dynamic panel by Arellano and bound (1991) method gives the value of the 
coefficient of GDP per capita growth rate. But, it needs to calculate the value of coefficient 
−α 1  in the growth model. It also needs to calculate the t-student of coefficient −α 1  which is 
equal to αα σ . Thus, table 2 of appendix B gives the values of all our estimations. It appears that 
this coefficient is negative and 1% significant in all our estimations. 
We used different approaches to analyze the stability and the robustness of our results. Indeed, 
the hypothesis of non autocorrelation in the regression model of the errors terms is essential so 
that the GMM estimator is efficient. Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed a test which allows 
verifying the absence of first and second order autocorrelation. Thus, if there is absence of 
autocorrelation in the distribution of errors terms, this test gives a negative and significant value 
of the differentiated residues in the first order and non significant in the second order. This test 
which is based on auto-covariance standardized average residues follows a normal law (N (0,1)) 
under the null hypothesis. By another way, the authors proposed the instruments validity test of 
Sargent. Thus, if the weighting matrix is optimally selected for a given instrument matrix, Sargent 
test statistics follows asymptotically a law of χ2  under the null hypothesis of validities 
instruments. Hansen tests (p = 1.00) and the second order autocorrelation tests of Arellano and 
Bond in general, do not allow rejecting the hypothesis of the validity of lagged variables in level 
and in differences as instrument, and the hypothesis non autocorrelation in second order (See 
table 3 of appendix B). In general, the results of our estimations are robust to eliminate rigorously 
all bias due to the non observed individual heterogeneity and offer, consequently, a better 
efficiency of our estimations results. In the same way, the coefficients are relatively stable through 
the different specifications. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this study, we analyzed the impact of taxation on economic growth of WAEMU countries. 
The particularity of this study is the using of GMM in dynamic panel of Arellano and Bond 
(1991) to analyze the relationship between taxation and economic growth. Concretely, we 
evaluate the impact of fiscal returns ratio on the prosperity that is-to-say on the growth rate per 
capita. The results are obtained from two specifications of our model. The first estimated the 
model on panel data where the variables correspond simultaneously to individual i (country) at time 
period t (year). The second specification estimated the model always on panel data where the 
variables correspond simultaneously to individual i (country) at time period t which is now 4-year 
averages of the annual data. Thus, the data are 4-year averages over the period 1989-2012 (6 
under periods of four years). The relationship between taxation and economic growth of 
WAEMU is positive and linear. Therefore, high and weak levels of taxation are favorable to 
economic growth. The WAEMU countries governments must not be concerned when they have 
committed in the expansionist fiscal policies. Though the WAEMU macroeconomic convergence 
criterions have defined a minimal level of fiscal pressure (17%) for all the Union countries and 
that besides much countries have not still reaches. According to the finding of this study, it 
would be beneficial for governments of the Union to achieve this minimal level to increase their 
fiscal revenue without a blow to economic growth. This conclusion is relative and may be change 
because of the numerous dummy variables we have included in our estimations.  
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7. Appendixes 
Appendix A: GMM estimator in system of dynamic panel 
GMM estimator in system associates equation in difference with equation in level. The equation 
in first difference (equation 3) is estimated simultaneously with equation in level (equation 2) by 
GMM. In equation in level, the variables are instrumented by their first differences. At this level, 
only the more recent first difference is used, the using of other lagged firsts differences result in 
redundancy of the conditions of moments (Arellano and Bover, 1995). Blundell and Bond (1998) 
tested this method with the simulations of Monte Carlo. These authors found that the GMM 
estimator in system is more efficient than the GMM estimator in differences. The latter produces 
the biased coefficients for the small samples. The bias is as much more important than the 
variables are persistent in time, the specific effects are important and the temporal dimension of 
the panel is weak. 
For equation in level, one uses additional conditions of moments supposing that the explanatory 
variables are stationary. 
                               ( ) ( )⋅  it it i ity y− − −− + = 0    = 11 for  τ τ µ ε τE                                           (7) 
                               ( ) ( )⋅  it it i itx x− − −1− + = 0    =1for  τ τ µ ε τE                                           (8) 
                               ( ) ( )⋅  it it i itz z− − −1− + = 0    =1for  τ τ µ ε τE                                           (9) 
The conditions of moments above (equations 4 to 9) associate with GMM allow estimating the 
model coefficients. To test the validity of the lagged variables as instruments, Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundel and Bond (1998) suggest the over identified test 
of Sargent/Hansen. By construction, the error term in first difference is correlated with first 
order, but it must not been to the second order. To test this hypothesis, these same authors 
suggest a second order autocorrelation test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Appendix B : Tables 
    Table 1: Estimation of taxation impact on economic growth per capita  
 (1) 
Annual 
(2) 
Annual 
(3) 
Annual 
(4) 
Annual 
(5) 
4-year 
averages 
(6) 
4-year 
averages 
(7) 
4-year 
averages 
(8) 
4-year 
averages 
txcroispibpt-1 0.103 0.081 0.139 0.032 0.312 0.215 0.100 0.066 
 (1.05) (0.90) (1.43) (0.45)  (3.28)** (1.17) (0.62) (0.21) 
revtax 0.531 0.858 0.602 1.057 0.568 1.153 0.690 1.425 
   (2.66)**   (2.39)** (1.52) (1.63)  (3.99)***   (2.39)** (0.96) (1.25) 
revtaxsq  -0.010 -0.010 -0.014  -0.021 -0.013 -0.013 
  (1.99)* (1.56) (1.49)  (1.66) (0.41) (0.62) 
invpri 0.163 0.166 0.011 -0.055 -0.200 -0.218 -0.091 -0.202 
 (1.54) (1.47) (0.08) (0.29)   (2.31)**   (1.95)* (0.64) (1.12) 
ouvcom -0.041 -0.010 0.023 0.005 -0.034 -0.023 -0.058 -0.097 
   (2.68)**  (2.15)* (0.37) (0.06) (2.69)**   (1.90)* (1.22)  (2.69)** 
depop -0.124 -0.214 -0.193 -0.258 0.184 0.153 -0.084 0.019 
   (2.39)**   (2.65)**   (2.31)**   (2.38)**   (2.01)* (1.23) (0.68) (0.06) 
txcroisft 0.137 0.104 0.115 0.056 0.518 0.398 0.369 0.694 
 (0.79) (0.68) (0.64) (0.33) (1.66) (1.04) (0.74) (1.27) 
dpgov   -0.016 -0.033   0.058 0.013 
   (0.29) (0.52)    (2.40)** (0.33) 
epnat   0.363 0.297   0.036 -0.100 
    (2.28)* (2.00)*   (0.60) (0.61) 
infl    0.144    0.166 
      (3.10)**    (1.51) 
lrevintpt     -2.420 -2.883  -1.978 
      (3.15)** (2.73)**  (0.47) 
dumtp1 1.206 2.620 1.348 3.309     
 (1.30)   (2.44)** (0.82)   (2.99)**     
dumtp2     -3.432 -2.716 -3.746  
     (3.93)*** (2.72)** (3.23)**  
dumtp3 11.041 12.063 10.954 12.483 4.722 4.816 3.874 6.615 
 (7.81)*** (10.8)***  (4.90)***  (6.54)*** (6.31)*** (6.45)***   (3.14)** (5.81)*** 
dumtp4     -3.835 -3.760 -3.848  
     (3.59)***  (2.79)** (3.56)***  
dumtp5     -4.440 -5.182 -3.311  
     (8.18)*** (6.67)*** (3.39)***  
dumtp6 12.951        
   (2.97)**        
dumdev 2.137 1.891 0.281 -1.990     
 (0.70) (0.64) (0.10) (0.96)     
dumbur91 8.134 8.754 7.912 7.974     
 (13.9)*** (15.1)*** (11.7)***  (16.6)***     
dumcd98 1.568 1.135 -0.646 -1.235     
   (2.66)** (1.36) (0.45) (0.63)     
dumcd10 -4.953 -6.764 -10.889 -10.789     
 (7.42)*** (6.13)***   (2.45)** (2.03)*     
dumma92 4.922 5.560 5.474 6.368     
 (4.98)*** (6.51)***  (4.07)*** (5.15)***     
dumnig92 -9.197 -8.125 -9.776 -7.689     
 (5.63)*** (5.70)***  (4.34)*** (7.97)***     
dumsen99 1.653 1.642 1.067 1.325     
 (10.0)*** (6.98)*** (1.70) (2.33)**     
dumtg91 -2.610 -3.007 -2.669 -1.430     
 (1.41) (1.88)* (1.67) (1.35)     
F statistic  106.03 20.15 11.76 7.41 139.21 123.89 132.71 257.15 
Observations 191 191 191 191 47 47 47 47 
Significant levels: *** p<0.01 ; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1. Robust standards errors are in the brackets.  
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Table 2: Calculation of coefficients values of the lagged endogenous variable in the  
                growth model ( −α 1 ) 
Estimations Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
(1) -0.897    0.097    -9.18 0.000 
(2) -0.918    0.089  -10.22 0.000 
(3) -0.860    0.097    -8.85 0.000 
(4) -0.968    0.071    -13.57 0.000 
(5) -0.688 0.095 -7.23 0.000 
(6) -0.784 0.184 -4.26 0.003 
(7) -0.900 0.161 -5.56 0.001 
(8) -0.934 0.315 -2.97 0.018 
Source : Author, based on the estimations. 
        Table 3: Robustness tests of the estimations  
 Obs. Test on AR(1) Test on AR(2) Sargent test  Hansen test 
(1) 191 Z=-1.84 [0.06] Z=-0.82 [0.41] chi2(8)=13.36 [0.10] chi2(8)=0.00 [1.00] 
(2) 191 Z=-2.02 [0.04] Z=-0.86 [0.39] chi2(9)=13.74 [0.13] chi2(9)=0.00 [1.00] 
(3) 191 Z=-2.00 [0.04] Z=-1.23 [0.22] chi2(9)=13.14 [0.15] chi2(9)=0.00 [1.00] 
(4) 191 Z=-2.24 [0.02] Z=-0.45 [0.65]   chi2(10)=18.3 [0.05]  chi2(10)=0.00 [1.00] 
(5) 47 Z=-1.19 [0.23] Z=-1.55 [0.12]  chi2(7)=15.0 [0.03] chi2(7)=0.00 [1.00] 
(6) 47 Z=-1.40 [0.16] Z=-1.30 [0.19]  chi2(8)=16.7 [0.03] chi2(8)=0.00 [1.00] 
(7) 47 Z=-1.24 [0.21] Z=-1.28 [0.20]  chi2(9)=22.9 [0.00] chi2(9)=0.00 [1.00] 
(8) 47 Z=-2.00 [0.04] Z=-1.78 [0.07]  chi2(11)=20.6 [0.3]  chi2(11)=0.00 [1.00] 
Source : Author, based on the estimations. 
Table 4: Unit root test on panel data (annual)  
Series  IPS LLC 
Test vc p-val Or. Int Test vc p-val Or. Int 
txcroispibpt -5.162 -2.620 0.000 I(0) -15.808 -10.114 0.0000 I(0) 
revtax -2.389 -1.990 0.003 I(0) -7.141 -3.0472 0.0012 I(0) 
invpri -3.466 -2.620 0.000 I(0) -9.160 -5.4240 0.0000 I(0) 
ouvcom -5.298 -2.620 0.000 I(0) -16.300 -11.165 0.0000 I(0) 
depop 0.595 -1.990 1.000 I(1) -3.742 0.2590 0.6022 I(1) 
txcroisft -2.857 -2.620 0.010 I(0) -7.907 -2.8588 0.0021 I(0) 
dpgov -13.115 -2.620 0.000 I(0) -39.756 -33.617 0.0000 I(0) 
epnat -2.810 -2.620 0.016 I(0) -8.166 -3.8098 0.0001 I(0) 
infl -4.313 -2.620 0.000 I(0) -12.922 -8.6718 0.0000 I(0) 
Source : Author, based on the World Data Indicator and the Statistics of BCEAO. 
Table 5: Unit root test on panel data (4-year averages) 
Series  IPS LLC 
Test vc p-val Or. Int Test vc p-val Or. Int 
txcroispibpt -2.131 -2.060 0.043 I(0) -7.580 -3.6519 0.0001 I(0) 
revtax -4.856 -2.740 0.000 I(0) -15.964 -14.697 0.0000 I(0) 
invpri -1.289 -2.060 0.722 I(1) -3.511 -2.2561 0.0120 I(0) 
ouvcom -5.732 -2.740 0.000 I(0) -25.769 -23.998 0.0000 I(0) 
depop -2.802 -2.740 0.046 I(0) -17.274 -16.079 0.0000 I(0) 
txcroisft -2.582 -2.740 0.135 I(1) -11.039 -8.5523 0.0000 I(0) 
dpgov -18.16 -2.740 0.000 I(0) -59.702 -58.178 0.0000 I(0) 
epnat -1.766 -2.060 0.237 I(1) -4.846 -2.5117 0.0060 I(0) 
infl -4.011 -2.740 0.000 I(0) -20.630 -19.139 0.0000 I(0) 
lrevintpt -2.717 -2.740 0.072 I(0) -10.167 -8.0328 0.0000 I(0) 
Source : Author, based on the World Data Indicator and the Statistics of BCEAO. 
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Table 6: Variables sources 
Variable Description Source 
GDP per capita growth rate  
Annual average of GDP per capita 
growth rate (in %) 
WDI 
Income tax  Fiscal returns as share of GDP (in %) BASTAT & WDI 
Initial income per capita 
Initial GDP per capita of each under 
period, current price (in %) 
WDI 
Public expendenture 
Total public expenditure as a share of 
GDP (in %) 
BASTAT & WDI 
Private investissement 
Private gross fixed capital formation 
as a share of GDP (in %) 
BASTAT 
Dependance ratio 
Population aged 0-14 and >65 as a 
share of total population (in %)         
WDI 
Openness trade 
Export et import as a share of GDP 
(in %) 
BASTAT & WDI 
Labor force growth rate  Annual average of labor force (in %) WDI 
National saving  
Domestic saving as a share of GDP 
(in %) 
WDI 
Inflation Annual inflation (en %) WDI 
      WDI : World Data Indicator. BASTAT : Statistics of BCEAO 
 
Tableau 7: Variables descriptions  
Variable Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Description 
GDP per capita 
growth rate  
48 0.500 2.09 -6.32 3.31 
Annual average of GDP 
per capita growth rate (in 
%) 
Income tax  48 13.20 4.61 5.84 27.62 
Fiscal returns as share of 
GDP (in %) 
Initial income per 
capita 
48 5.23 0.331 3.74 5.74 
Initial GDP per capita of 
each under period, current 
price (in %) 
Public expendenture 48 28.80 39.53 15.16 293.2 
Total public expendenture 
as a share of GDP (in %) 
Private 
investissement 
48 10.58 5.34 1.43 29.94 
Private gross fixed capital 
formation as a share of 
GDP (in %) 
Dependance ratio 48 48.16 2.00 44.75 52.44 
Population aged 0-14 and 
>65 as a share of total 
population (in %) 
Openness trade 48 69.37 45.70 31.65 331.8 
Export et import as a share 
of GDP (in %) 
Labor force growth 
rate  
48 2.44 1.17 0.46 4.62 
Annual average of labor 
force (in %) 
National saving  48 7.04 7.55 -13.4 21.81 
Domestic saving as a share 
of GDP (in %) 
Inflation 48 5.85 10.48 -3.97 60.24 Annual inflation (en %) 
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Appendix C : Figures  
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Figure 1: Fiscal and non fiscal returns ratio as a share of the 
total returns of the WAEMU
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Figure 4: GDP per capita growth rate and fiscal returns 
ratio of Ivoiry Coast
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Figure 5: GDP per capita growth rate and fiscal returns 
ratio of Guinea Bissau
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Figure 6: GDP per capita growth rate and fiscal returns 
ratio of Mali
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Figure 7: GDP per capita growth rate and fiscal returns 
ratio of Niger
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Figure 8: GDP per capita growth rate and fiscal returns 
ratio of Senegal
txcroispibpt revtax
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010
Figure 9: GDP per capita growth rate and fiscal returns 
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